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[L]aws and institutions for the defense of human rights [must] rap-
idly evolve to the new reality of climate change. When vulnerable
communities have tried to use human rights law to defend their
rights and seek climate justice, important weaknesses [in human
rights law] have been revealed. It is almost impossible for popula-
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tions in poor countries to identify and pursue channels of justice,
to have their cases heard, or to prove responsibility.1
INTRODUCTION
In 2005, the Inuit of Canada and the United States filed a petition with
the Inter American Commission on Human Rights, alleging that their re-
spective governments had violated their human rights by failing to miti-
gate climate change harms.2 The Inuit alleged violations of several specific
human rights, including the right to enjoy their culture;3 the right to enjoy
and use the lands they have traditionally occupied;4 the right to use and
enjoy their personal property;5 the right to health;6 the right to life, physi-
cal integrity, and security;7 the right to their own means of subsistence;8
and the right to residence and movement and inviolability in the home.9
Although the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights ultimately
rejected the petition,10 the Inuit’s petition marked the beginning of world-
wide attempts to recognize the adverse effects of climate change on
human rights.11
By November 2007, the Maldives had convened a meeting of small
island states to discuss climate change implications for their individual
countries.12 The Maldives, a country of approximately 400,000 people in
the Indian Ocean, has taken a leading role in climate change discussions,
particularly in discussions related to rising sea levels.13 At the November
2007 meeting, the so-called Alliance of Small Island States issued the Male´
1. Submission of Mali to the Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights
(OHCHR) Study, Human Rights and Climate Change (Sept. 2008) [hereinafter Mali Submis-
sion], available at http://www2.ohchr.org/English/issues/climatechange/docs/Mali.pdf (au-
thor’s translation).
2. Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief from
Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the United
States (Dec. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Inuit Petition], available at http:// http://www.inuitcircum
polar.com/files/uploads/icc-files/FINALPetitionICC.pdf.
3. Id. at 74.
4. Id. at 79.
5. Id. at 83.
6. Id. at 85.
7. Id. at 89.
8. Id. at 92.
9. Id. at 94.
10. Marc Limon, Human Rights and Climate Change: Constructing a Case for Political
Action, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 439, 441 (2009).
11. In many respects, the Inuit’s petition sparked a movement to incorporate human
rights into climate change much like the Warren County, North Carolina protests sparked the
Environmental Justice movement in the United States. See Renee Skelton & Vernice Miller,
The Environmental Justice Movement, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL, available at http://www.nrdc
.org/ej/history/hej.asp (last visited Mar. 15, 2014).
12. Limon, supra note 10, at 442.
13. Maldives, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/mv.html (last updated Feb. 26, 2014).
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Declaration, a statement that unequivocally declared, “climate change has
clear and immediate implications for the full enjoyment of human
rights.”14 These nations called upon the United Nations to “address the
issue as a matter of urgency.”15
The United Nations responded. On March 28, 2008, the United Na-
tions Human Rights Council (UNHRC) adopted Resolution 7/23, which
stated that climate change “has implications for the full enjoyment of
human rights.”16 The resolution rested on several prior treaties, including
the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Vienna Declaration
and Programme of Action.17 The Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights then asked individual states to submit information regard-
ing the impact of climate change on human rights within their various
territories.18
The UNHRC’s Resolution concerned itself with several specific
rights.19 In particular, it found that climate change could impact the right
to food, the right to health, the right to housing, and, by implication, the
right to self-determination.20 It is these rights, as well as the right to life
mentioned in the Inuit petition, that the majority of scholars have focused
on during subsequent discussions regarding climate change and human
rights.21
14. Small Island States Conference, Male´, Maldives, Nov. 13-14, 2007, Male´ Declara-
tion on the Human Dimension of Global Climate Change, at 2 (Nov. 14, 2007), available at
http://www.ciel.org/Publications/Male_Declaration_ Nov07.pdf.
15. Limon, supra note 10, at 442.
16. H.R.C. Rep. of the Human Rights Council on its Seventh Session, Res. 7/23, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/7/78, at 65 (July 14, 2008) [hereinafter UNHRC 7/23].
17. Id.
18. OHCHR, OHCHR Study on the Relationship Between Climate Change and
Human Rights: Submissions and Reference Documents Received, available at http://www
.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/HRAndClimateChange/Pages/Submissions.aspx. For an example of
one such submission, see Mali Submission, supra note 1.
19. UNHRC 7/23, supra note 16.
20. Id. ¶1; see also, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III)
A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
21. See, e.g., Margaux J. Hall & David C. Weiss, Avoiding Adaptation Apartheid: Cli-
mate Change Adaptation and Human Rights Law, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 309, 332 (2012) (dis-
cussing the right to health); David B. Hunter, Human Rights Implications for Climate Change
Negotiations, 11 OR. REV. INT’L L. 331, 332–33 (2009) (stating that climate change has impli-
cated the rights to life, health, adequate food, adequate water, housing, and self-determina-
tion); John H. Knox, Linking Human Rights and Climate Change at the United Nations, 33
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 477, 486 (2009) [hereinafter Knox, United Nations] (noting, in the
context of small island states, that climate change will impact residents’ rights to life, health,
food, water, housing, and self-determination); John H. Knox, Climate Change and Human
Rights Law, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 163, 207–210 (2009) [hereinafter Knox, Human Rights] (dis-
cussing the rights to food, health, and self-determination); Limon, supra note 10, at 446 (not-
ing that climate change will impact the right to life, right to adequate food, right to water,
right to adequate housing, and the right to self-determination).
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Specifically, in the months following the UNHRC’s Resolution, schol-
ars largely focused on human rights law as it related to climate change
mitigation—that is, how to hold large emitting nations for human rights
violations arising from failures to mitigate climate harms.22 In many ways,
this was a logical starting point: why not attempt to hold those actually
responsible for climate change accountable for their past emissions, or for
failing to curb future emissions? Due in large part to the weakness of the
international human rights regime,23 however, scholars soon realized that
holding large emitters responsible for extraterritorial harms due to climate
change would be nearly impossible.24
Accordingly, scholars began to turn their attention elsewhere, with
several more recent papers specifically examining the applicability of the
human rights regime to climate change adaptation.25 In some ways, this
approach has proven more successful. In certain situations, for instance, it
might well be possible to use human rights law to hold nations responsible
for failing to adequately adapt to climate change.26 Specifically, a nation
might—by improperly adapting to future climate change-related disas-
ters—be held responsible for failing to guard its citizens’ human rights.
This Note uses the unique lens of environmental justice, a theory
largely concerned with basic fairness for all communities, to examine this
adaptation-focused body of scholarship and to evaluate its likely implica-
tions for the world’s most vulnerable nations. Environmental justice is a
particularly salient means of evaluating the efficacy of the adaptation-fo-
cused approach to climate change, because the theory’s central premise is
that environmental benefits and burdens should be distributed evenly
across communities and populations. Using the principles of environmen-
tal justice on an international level, then, is a way to elucidate the differ-
ences in environmental benefits and burdens across national boundaries.
This Note uses the cross-border insights of environmental justice to
assess the efficacy of addressing those human rights27 violations likely to
22. See discussion infra Part III B.
23. Human Rights Law is a relatively weak regime. Early scholarship on the subject
focused on finding ways to hold different nations liable for mitigation; not finding a satisfac-
tory link to hold emitting countries liable for mitigation failures, the scholarship has turned to
imposing liability for climate change based on failures to properly adapt. See infra n. 115.
24. See Hall & Weiss, supra note 21, at 341–345 (discussing the difficulties involved in
applying human rights law to climate change mitigation, including, for example, weak en-
forcement regimes as well as substantive and procedural problems associated with various
human rights treaties).
25. Id.; Essentially, climate change adaptation, as opposed to mitigation, is comprised
of acts taken by a state in preparation for climate change-related threats to its citizenry. For a
more complete definition, see the discussion infra Part IV A.
26. This argument is fully discussed infra Part IV.
27. For the purposes of determining exactly what qualifies as a “human right,” this
paper will mainly discuss those rights that the UNHRC stated were implicated by climate
change; most significantly, the right to food, the right to health, the right to housing, and the
right to self-determination. See UNHRC 7/23, supra note 16. The paper also discusses the
right to life, noted by the Inuit in their petition. Inuit Petition, supra note 2.
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arise from global climate change via an adaptation-focused framework,
particularly as such a framework relates to those developing nations most
likely to be affected by climate change.28 Specifically, the Note argues
that, although an adaptation-based approach might initially seems more
likely to succeed than a mitigation-based approach, it has distinct weak-
nesses that policy makers should take into account before imposing liabil-
ity on a state for a failure to adapt to climate change.
The Note will begin by examining the current projections for adverse
climate change effects, and by exploring how these effects are likely to fall
disproportionately upon those nations least able to adapt to climate
change. In this respect, it will examine climate change from the standpoint
of developing as opposed to developed countries. For the purposes of this
discussion, I will assume, as have recent writers on the subject,29 that the
evidence proving anthropogenic climate change is now incontrovertible.30
Part II will then explore how a human rights-based approach to cli-
mate change accords with the goals of environmental justice, and why en-
vironmental justice is a useful lens through which to examine human rights
in this context. By first examining the specific rights that could be impli-
cated in climate change, this Part will show that those most likely to suffer
the infringement of these rights reside in precisely those nations with
which the environmental justice movement is principally concerned. Fram-
ing climate change as a human rights issue has several benefits over a
traditional political approach, all of which I will describe in this Part. Fi-
nally, this part will discuss the ways in which scholars have attempted to
import human rights into climate change negotiations,31 including the con-
cept of diagonal jurisdiction, as well as through climate change mitigation
and adaptation.
28. “[T]he world’s poor are especially vulnerable to the effects of climate change, in
particular those concentrated in high-risk areas, and also tend to have more limited adapta-
tion capacities [. . .]” UNHRC 7/23, supra note 16.
29. See, e.g., Hall & Weiss, supra note 21, at 317; CAMILLA TOULMIN, CLIMATE
CHANGE IN AFRICA 5 (2009).
30. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007 Synthesis Re-
port 1 (2007) [hereinafter IPCC Report], available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-re
port/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf. In March 2014, the IPCC released the most recent report regarding
global climate change.  Darryl Fears, U.N. Panel Issues Stern Report on Global Warming,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Apr. 13, 2014, 11:20 PM), http://www.post-gazette.com/news/
environment/2014/04/14/U-N-panel-issues-stern-report-on-global-warming/stories/201404140
051; Eric Holthaus, Climate Change Could Start the Next World War, BUSINESS INSIDER
(Apr. 19, 2014, 10:27 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/climate-change-military-2014-4
(“In a sentence, here’s what [the IPCC reports] found: On our current path, climate change
could pose an irreversible, existential risk to civilization as we know it”). While a synthesis
report is not due until October 2014, the summary for policymakers confirms that climate
change continues to threaten vulnerable communities worldwide. Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change, Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability, Summary
for Policymakers, available at http://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/IPCC_WG2AR5_
SPM_Approved.pdf.
31. See generally, Hunter, supra note 21.
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Part III will assess the most current view of the how best to import
human rights law into climate change related harms, and will discuss the
merits of using human rights law as it applies to climate change adaptation
specifically. In addition to discussing why an adaptation approach may be
the most practical way of using human rights law to vindicate the rights of
those who may be affected by climate change, this Part discusses the ex-
pressive benefits that adaption-based proponents put forth.
Finally, having considered climate change’s relationship to environ-
mental justice, the connection between environmental justice and human
rights, and the use of human rights law in the context of climate change
adaptation, the Note examines the potential constraints on utilizing human
rights as a way to punish countries that do not properly adapt to climate
change. Specifically, the Note discusses difficulties based in political and
economic concerns, as well as concerns rooted in the broader conceptual-
ization of environmental justice. Though the approach of using human
rights in climate change adaptation does have many benefits, policymakers
should be cautious in utilizing the approach for anything other than as a
means to influence international cooperation through traditional, extraju-
dicial means.
Before continuing, however, the meaning of “environmental justice”
in this context necessarily merits a brief explanation. Though a deeper dis-
cussion follows,32 it is worth noting here that this paper takes a specific
view of environmental justice, wherein actions are evaluated for their ef-
fects on states as international actors, instead of evaluating policy results
on specific communities within each state. Otherwise stated, this Note will
assume that developing state actors are the relevant communities for
which environmental justice would be concerned in the context of climate
change, instead of attempting to evaluate discrete environmental justice
communities within each developing state.33
There are two distinct reasons for taking this approach. First, the state
as an actor is the only cognizable entity on the international stage. A par-
ticular community within a developing country is simply unable to vindi-
cate its rights through international law in the same manner as the state
within which it is located, who effectively acts as parens patriae for the
32. Infra Part II B.
33. There are admittedly difficulties with this approach. “[O]ne may question whether
states always adequately represent the interests of those most vulnerable to climate change.”
Knox, Human Rights, supra note 21, at 216. It is possible that states do not always represent
the best interests of their constituents on the international sphere, particularly with regards
to the poorest communities within each state. However, there are extreme difficulties in at-
tempting an environmental justice analysis with regards to discrete communities within each
developing country. For example, an ethnic group who is the subject of discrimination in one
nation may be a majority group in another nation. A paper such as this is simply inadequate
to be able to evaluate the specific socio-economic internal politics of every developing nation
in the hopes of anticipating potential human rights violations for each individual community.
Furthermore, the difficulties and disparities within countries regarding climate change harms
are less than the disparities in climate change costs and benefits when comparing developed
countries and developing countries.
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purposes of international law. Second, any harms that occur to an individ-
ual due to climate change are necessarily harms that, by extension, occur
to the state. That is, the state suffers a harm because its people suffer
harms, and any costs imposed by climate change are borne by both the
state and its people.
I. CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
Between 2000 and 2004, approximately 262 million people were af-
fected by climate change disasters yearly.34 Of these, over 98% were lo-
cated in the developing world. 35 The number of people facing climate
change related disasters is only expected to rise as greenhouse gases
(GHGs) continue to accumulate in the atmosphere.36 Risk of human de-
velopment setbacks is expected to rise in the future as well.37
Different areas of the world, however, will experience climate change
differently. One author has described the split between those countries
that will not experience massive adverse effects of climate change and
those that will as a North-South divide based principally upon geography
and history.38 This author states that, “[r]eports demonstrate that the least
responsible parties for climate change, i.e. developing countries, are the
most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.”39 These “Countries of
the South”40 are not only vulnerable because of their geographic loca-
tions,41 but also because of their “low average per capita income, low rates
of literacy, low health status, low life expectancies, limited infrastructure,
fragility of economic progress, high vulnerability to economic setbacks,
lack of capital, large agricultural sectors, and reliance on export of primary
products.”42 Two regions of the world stand out as being particularly vul-
34. Hunter, supra note 21, at 344.
35. Id.
36. See, U.N. Dev. Programme, Human Development Report 2007/2008, Fighting Cli-
mate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World 90 (2007) [hereinafter UNDP Human
Development Report 2007/2008], available at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/
268/hdr_20072008_en_complete.pdf. For a basic discussion of the evidence of climate change,
see TOULMIN, supra note 29, at 16–18.
37. Hall & Weiss, supra note 21, at 318-19 (“Scientific consensus has coalesced around
the idea that the risk of massive human development setbacks increases substantially beyond
3.6 degrees Fahrenheit of temperature change over historic levels, a degree of change which
current emissions will well exceed”).
38. See RUCHI ANAND, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 3,6 (2004)
(describing the split as between the countries of the Northern Hemisphere and those of the
Southern Hemisphere). This obviously isn’t true in all cases—for example, Australia, New
Zealand, Brazil and South Africa are all in the Southern Hemisphere and all tend to identify
with the more affluent countries of the Northern Hemisphere—but it serves as a general
guideline for determining what nations will be most affected by climate change.
39. Id. at 35.
40. Id. at 3.
41. Id. at 38 (describing how many developing nations are likely to be located in arid
or semi arid areas that are particularly vulnerable to climate change).
42. Id. at 3.
644 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 35:637
nerable to climate change: Sub-Saharan Africa and the low-lying island
nations of the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
A. Projected Vulnerability of Certain Developing Regions
“Africa is the continent that will be hit hardest by climate change.
Unpredictable rains and floods, prolonged droughts, subsequent crop fail-
ures and rapid desertification, among other signs of global warming,
have . . . already begun to change the face of Africa.”43 Toulmin writes
that the principle adverse effects of climate change on Africa will be “in-
creased aridity, sea level rise, reduced fresh water availability, cyclones,
coastal erosion, deforestation, loss of forest quality, woodland degrada-
tion, coral bleaching, the spread of malaria and impacts on food
security.”44
To illustrate the vulnerability of Sub-Saharan Africa, one need look
no further than devastating climate events of the past several years. In
2011, for example, a terrible drought hit the Horn of Africa, “affect[ing] 11
countries and 12 million people.”45 While this was happening in the East,
the Niger River in the West reached its highest levels in 80 years, leaving 1
million people homeless on its expanded banks.46 The varying rainfalls in
different regions of Africa due to climate change will certainly impact the
ability of Africans to collect adequate amounts of food,47 and will un-
doubtedly affect their ability to collect an adequate supply of water. 48 The
region also ranks high on the list of places that will be susceptible to politi-
cal instability and armed conflict based upon the effects of climate
change.49 As one of the world’s poorest regions,50 Africa is one of the
43. Statement by 2004 Nobel Peace Prize Winner Dr. Wangari Muta Maathai, as
quoted in Environmental Sustainability for Development in South Sudan, SOUTH SUDAN
NEWS AGENCY (Feb. 29, 2012), available at http://www.southsudannewsagency.com/opinion/
articles/environmental-sustainability-for-development.
44. TOULMIN, supra note 29, at 24.
45. Ghana: Climate Change Brings Opportunity Alongside Challenges for Africa, AL-
LAFRICA (Nov. 28, 2011), http://allafrica.com/stories/201111282203.html.
46. Id.
47. See KIRSTIN DOW & THOMAS E. DOWNING, THE ATLAS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 65
(mapping projected world-wide crop yields for 2030 based upon climate change, and finding,
with a few exceptions, that many of Africa’s staple crops will be less plentiful in the future);
see also TOULMIN, supra note 29, at 50 (describing the particular effects that climate change
will have on Africa’s food supply).
48. See UNDP Human Development Report 2007/2008, supra note 36, at 13 (noting
that women and girls in Africa are already spending greater portions of their days in the
collection of water).
49. See DOW & DOWNING, supra note 47, at 43 (showing 23 African countries that will
be at a high risk of armed conflict due to climate change, and another 13 that will be at risk
for political instability); TOULMIN, supra note 29, at 109 (discussing how conflict could arise
in Africa due to climate change).
50. See Mark Doyle, Why is the African Continent Poor?, BBC News, http://news.bbc
.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8215083.stm (last updated August 29, 2009).
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world’s regions least capable of adequately adapting to the changing
climate.
Outlooks for low-lying island nations are similarly bleak.51 The
Maldives is a prime example of a nation that could be completely inun-
dated in the future as a direct result of climate change.52 The average
height above sea level for the Maldives is less than two meters. If the sea
level were to increase by approximately half a meter, it could flood 15% of
the nation’s most populous island, Male´, by 2025.53 This same model
shows that half of the island would be underwater by 2100.54
Other island nations are in a similar position. The Marshall Islands,
for example, discussed the threat to its “territorial integrity” in its
OHCHR submission.55 Its submission noted recent examples of increased
flooding,56 as well as a difficulty in continuing to operate an adequate in-
frastructure to give citizens access to clean water.57 Most notably though,
the Marshall Islands expressed its fear that the Marshallese would become
“climate refugees.”58 The Marshall Islands and the Maldives are not the
only ones who need to fear inundation in the coming century: Tuvalu and
Vanuatu are also in danger of sinking below the rising ocean in the
future.59
In fact, the world may have already seen its first “climate refugees.”
The residents of Huene, an island in the Carteret Atoll in Papua New
Guinea have twice attempted to leave their home for a new island; they
have twice returned due to conflicts with the new island’s original inhabi-
tants.60 Experts note, however, that their home island may be uninhabit-
51. See, e.g., Submission of the Maldives to OHCHR Study, Human Rights and Cli-
mate Change 19 (Sept. 25, 2008) [hereinafter Maldives Submission], available at http://www
.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/ClimateChange/Submissions/Maldives_Submission.pdf (“Sea-
level rise is likely to continue for centuries and ultimately completely immerse the
Maldives.”).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Submission of the Republic of the Marshall Islands to OHCHR Study, Human
Rights and Climate Change 4 (Dec. 2008) [hereinafter Marshall Islands Submission], availa-
ble at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/ClimateChange/Submissions/Republic_of_the
_Marshall_Islands.doc.
56. Id. at 8.
57. Id. at 6.
58. Id. at 10.
59. Limon, supra note 10, at 456.
60. See DOW & DOWNING, supra note 47, at 69 (“The 2,000 inhabitants of the Carteret
islands, Papua New Guinea, have been forced to move to an adjoining island, after their fruit
trees were killed by an increasingly saline water supply, and their homes were washed away
by high tides and storms.”); Neil MacFarquhar, Refugees Join List of Climate Change Issues,
N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2009, at A4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/29/world/
29refugees.html?_r=0. See also Morgan Godfery, New Zealand Refuses Climate Change Refu-
gees – Mass Action Is Now Needed, THE GUARDIAN (May 11, 2014, 8:40 PM), http://www
.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/12/new-zealand-refuses-climate-change-refugees-
mass-action-is-now-needed (discussing a recent case in New Zealand, where I-Kiribati were
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able by 2015.61 By 2050, there may be as many as 200 million such
refugees worldwide.62 Some nations are preparing, in various ways, to
move to safer land in higher countries.63
B. Applying Environmental Justice Principles to Climate Change
The plight of both Sub-Saharan Africa and the low-lying island na-
tions due to climate change is made all the worse by the fact that these
nations, as a whole, had little to no hand in creating the problem in the
first place.64 Otherwise stated, “the countries that bear the least responsi-
bility for creating the problem [of global warming] are the most vulnerable
to climate change.”65 The countries of the developing world, then, bear
much greater costs related to climate change than those in the more devel-
oped North, while those in the North reap the vast majority of the benefits
of emitting GHGs.66 “This equation does not represent a fair or just
scenario.”67
The concepts of fairness and justice are two core precepts of the envi-
ronmental justice movement. Environmental justice advocates stress that
“environmental burdens and benefits should not fall in disproportionate
patterns.”68 In the United States, this has manifested itself in the context
of economically disadvantaged communities and communities of color,
who have historically borne the brunt of the environmental effects of
heavy industry siting.69 The framework has been broadened when discuss-
ing international climate justice.70 Though environmental justice has tradi-
denied refuge because they were not within the legal definition of refugees, despite being
refugees under a “sociological definition”).
61. MacFarquhar, supra note 60.
62. Id.
63. These nations include Kiribati, Paul Chapman, Entire Nation of Kiribati to be relo-
cated over rising sea level threat, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 7, 2012 8:59 AM), http://www.tele-
graph.co.uk/news/worldnews/australiaandthepacific/kiribati/9127576/Entire-nation-of-
Kiribati-to-be-relocated-over-rising-sea-level-threat.html; Tuvalu, Leslie Allen, Will Tuvalu
Disappear Beneath the Sea?, SMITHSONIAN.COM (Aug. 2004), http://www.smithsonianmag
.com/travel/tuvalu.html?c=y&page=3 (“[Tuvalu’s] leaders had just started asking Australia
and New Zealand to accept Tuvaluans as environmental refugees . . .”); and the Maldives,
Knox, United Nations, supra note 21, at 498.
64. DOW & DOWNING, supra note 47, at 46–47 (showing that Sub-Saharan Africa has
been responsible for 2% of world-wide historical emissions, and that “other countries includ-
ing small islands” have historically been responsible for 0.4% of GHG emissions); see also
Marshall Islands Submission, supra note 55, at 6 (“The Republic of the Marshall Islands has
essentially nil greenhouse gas emissions”).
65. ANAND, supra note 38, at 28.
66. See id. at 17.
67. Id. at 55.
68. CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN ET AL, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: LAW, POLICY, AND
REGULATION 3 (2009).
69. Id. at 37 (describing the disparate levels of hazardous waste facility placement be-
tween communities of color and predominantly white communities).
70. See id. at 400.
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tionally been concerned with intra-state inequality, the extrapolation of
the theory to global climate change necessarily requires an inter-state anal-
ysis that takes into account states as the relevant communities of analysis.
Historically, the environmental justice movement has focused on four
separate conceptualizations of “justice”: distributive justice,71 procedural
justice,72 corrective justice,73 and social justice.74 Each of the four concep-
tualizations of “justice” as defined by the environmental justice movement
is implicated at the inter-state level by the harms associated with climate
change.
The differential burdens and benefits accruing to both developed and
developing countries undoubtedly implicate distributive justice concerns.
In the domestic context, environmental justice demands that each person
has a “right to equal treatment,” and an equal distribution of goods and
opportunities.75 Extrapolating this definition to climate change on the in-
ternational scale, environmental justice demands an equal distribution of
costs and benefits for GHG emissions.76 Equality amongst nations on the
costs and benefits of climate change, however, is a long way off. “On a per
capita basis, although countries of the South do not consume as many re-
sources and are less polluting of the atmosphere by carbon dioxide or sul-
fur dioxide emissions, they bear greater costs than the benefits they accrue
as compared to countries of the North.”77 This difference in costs and ben-
efits is the hallmark of a system that lacks distributional fairness. The vast
poverty in developing countries only serves to exacerbate the problem;
indeed, the “disproportional impact is relevant . . . where climate effects
will be felt most acutely by those groups who are already in vulnerable
situations.”78
71. “[T]he right to equal treatment, that is, to the same distribution of goods and op-
portunities as anyone else has or is given.” Robert R. Kuehn, A Taxonomy of Environmental
Justice, 30 ENVTL. LAW REP. 10681, 10683 (2000).
72. “[T]he right to treatment as an equal. That is the right, not to an equal distribution
of some good or opportunity, but to equal concern and respect in the political decision about
how these goods and opportunities are to be distributed.” Id.
73. “Corrective justice involves not only the just administration of punishment to
those who break the law, but also a duty to repair the losses for which one is responsible.” Id.
at 10683.
74. “[T]hat branch of the virtue of justice that moves us to use our best efforts to bring
about a more just ordering of society – one in which people’s needs are more fully met. The
demands of social justice are . . . first, that the members of every class have enough resources
and enough power to live as befits human beings, and second, that the privileged classes,
whoever they are, be accountable to the wider society for the way they use their advantages.”
Id. at 10698.
75. Id.
76. While “equality” in this sense may be somewhat vague—for example, should costs
and benefits be based on a per-capita basis, or should each nation share costs and benefits
based on some other criteria—it is clear that there is anything but parity on the international
stage at this point.
77. ANAND, supra note 38, at 17.
78. Dr. Siobhan McInerney-Lankford, Human Rights and Climate Change: Reflections
on International Legal Issues and Potential Policy Relevance, in THREATENED ISLAND NA-
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Procedural justice is also a concern in the context of climate change.
Domestically, environmental justice has stood for the ideal that each com-
munity be given the chance to be represented in decision-making bodies
that decide how goods, resources, and costs are allocated.79 The ideal of
procedural justice does not change at all in the international context. In
short, each nation should have an equal say in how the benefits and harms
of GHG emissions are allocated worldwide.
As far as procedural justice goes, however, the states of the develop-
ing world simply lack power to be considered equally at the bargaining
table.80 The Marshall Islands, for example, has stated that “international
multilateral negotiations have created a platform under which [the Mar-
shall Islands], with limited political weight, is forced to bargain desperately
against large political powers, in an attempt to preserve what should other-
wise be rights entitled to all humans.”81 The disparities in bargaining
power are particularly unjust, considering that, because developing coun-
tries do not emit much to begin with, they have little to bargain with in
terms of emissions reductions. In contrast, the largest emitting countries
are politically powerful in climate change negotiations precisely because
they have emissions they are able to reduce.
Climate change harms similarly violate the idea of corrective justice,
which holds that a person or group that causes a generalized harm to an-
other has a duty to make good those losses for which the person or group
is responsible. In the context of global climate change, the implications of
this ideal are clear: those nations that are primarily responsible for climate
change should “repair the losses for which [they] are responsible.”82
Through the lens of corrective justice, then, the worst emitters should, at
the very least, be obligated to help those nations who will bear the brunt
of climate change deal with its effects. This could be through technological
transfers, or monetary transfers; indeed, developed countries have set up
several funds to help developing countries deal with the adverse effects of
climate change.83 However, there is currently no overarching plan to help
TIONS: LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF RISING SEAS AND A CHANGING CLIMATE 195, 199 (Michael
B. Gerrard & Gregory E. Wannier eds., 2013).
79. Kuehn, supra note 71.
80. It is also worth noting that environmental justice concerns could very well exist
within each state as well as on the international stage. See ANAND, supra note 38, at 39,
quoting MATHEW PATERSON, GLOBAL WARMING AND GLOBAL POLITICS (1996) (discussing
how, within individual states, there may be minority groups that lack specific protections and
may be more vulnerable to government inaction as it relates to climate change). As an exam-
ple, an ethnic group could show differential treatment in government permitting. See gener-
ally Ogoniland Case, Comm. No. 155/96 (Nigeria). As noted earlier, however, I primarily
approach the concept of environmental justice as it relates to states in their capacity as sover-
eigns on the international stage. See supra Part I.
81. Marshall Islands Submission, supra note 55, at 13.
82. Kuehn, supra note 71.
83. See Hall & Weiss, supra note 21, at 321–22 (discussing different methods for fund-
ing adaptation in the developing world); DOW & DOWNING, supra note 47, at 98–99 (discuss-
ing different means of funding climate change responses and showing that only a small
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each developing nation deal with the effects of climate change, and fund-
ing for adaptation projects has consistently languished behind the requests
of developing nations.84
Finally, the idea of social justice requires an examination of whether
each person is able to live “as befits a human being”85 and whether those
who are more advantaged—in this case, the more developed nations of the
North—are accountable for the way in which they use their advantages.
Climate change’s effect on human rights certainly calls into question
whether each person, particularly in developing countries, is able to live as
befits a human being. It is also certainly possible to question whether the
industrialized emitters of the North have used their advantages in a way
that respects the rights of developing countries.86 Taken on the interna-
tional level, this concept of social justice can also be analogized to tradi-
tional ideas of international sovereignty: a nation should be free to govern
itself without unnecessary hindrances from other states. Climate change—
caused by large emitting states—is certainly a hindrance for developing
nations.
The climate change harms that currently befall the developing world
implicate all aspects of environmental justice. The benefits of climate
change—namely, industrialization and wealth—have accrued principally
upon the emitting nations of the Northern Hemisphere, while those in the
developing world will be left to foot the bill. In the next Part, this Note will
address the human rights that are implicated by the adverse effects of cli-
mate change and how they relate to environmental justice’s broader con-
ceptions of “justice.”87
proportion of Overseas Development Assistance goes towards financing climate change miti-
gation and adaptation); see also infra Part IV A (discussing the Adaptation Fund).
84. Hunter, supra note 21, at 360.
85. This is, of course, similar to expressions of basic human rights, discussed infra Part
III A.
86. The Marshall Islands makes just this contention. See Marshall Islands Submission
supra note 55, at 5. Environmental justice, particularly in the context of social justice, is not
concerned solely with the environment, but rather the broader milieu in which society and
environment reflect each other. In this respect, “[c]limate change is as much a humanitarian
and human development concern as it is an environmental one. The most vulnerable popula-
tions are not the people driving climate change. Of those living on less than a dollar a day,
few have electricity, cars, refrigerators, or water heaters. But, because their lives are tied to
climate conditions and they have few resources to buffer against bad or progressively difficult
conditions, they are likely to bear the highest human costs.” DOW & DOWNING, supra note
47, at 12.
87. It is important to note, here, that a situation that causes an environmental justice
concern is not a per se violation of international human rights law. As such, environmental
justice itself is not a part of international law. However, the concerns that environmental
justice raises are indicative of a potential for human rights violations, and as such, are useful
in evaluating situations for their implications on recognized human rights.
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II. HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF CLIMATE CHANGE
A. Human Rights and the Benefits of an Environmental Justice Lens
International human rights treaties enshrine several rights, among
them the rights to adequate food, adequate housing, life, health, and self-
determination.88 These human rights can be split into three general cate-
gories:89 1) civil and political rights;90 2) economic, social, and cultural
rights;91 and 3) rights held by groups or by individuals because of their
membership in a group.92 In some way, each of these human rights is im-
plicated by climate change, particularly in the developing world.
The right to self-determination is one of the principle rights that may
be lost due to climate change, and is of great concern to nations such as
the Marshall Islands.93 The right of a people to govern themselves, pre-
served in the ICCPR,94 raises environmental justice concerns, particularly
with respect to procedural justice. For example, imagine that in fifty years,
a small island nation is submerged. Its people move to another country
where they must assimilate. From a procedural justice standpoint, these
people are no longer given an equal voice on the international stage. Their
original government would no longer be able to advocate for their inter-
ests, their voices subsumed into their new host country’s international rep-
resentation. Because procedural justice dictates that each shareholder be
given a voice at the bargaining table, the loss of that voice on the interna-
tional stage would offend this notion of justice.95
Offenses against the rights to life, food, and housing also raise ques-
tions of environmental justice, though for these rights the concern is
rooted in distributive justice. The violation of each of these human rights
is, in a very real sense, a cost that individuals and their state representa-
tives must bear due to the actions of others. For example, extreme weather
events and rising sea levels have the potential to kill countless individuals
worldwide. Climate change, in contributing to the severity of such events,
88. See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 20, arts. 3–11 (the right to life); International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, arts. 11–12, opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR] (the rights to
food, water, and housing); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1,
(DATE) 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (the right of a people to self-determination).
89. Knox, Human Rights, supra note 21, at 168–69.
90. ICCPR, supra note 88.
91. ICESCR, supra note 88.
92. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 88, art. 1; Convention on the Rights of the Child,
opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990).
93. Marshall Islands Submission, supra note 55; see also, Maldives Submission, supra
note 51.
94. ICCPR, supra note 88, art. 1.
95. This situation is not far fetched, particularly in light of the geopolitics of Oceania.
Australia and New Zealand—by far the two most populous countries in the region—would
be likely receiver states for climate refugees.
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could thus be directly responsible for violations of the right to life.96 Cli-
mate change similarly implicates the right to health, in that the number of
people expected to suffer from cases of diarrhea, malnutrition, and mala-
ria is expected to dramatically increase by 2030.97 The right to food would
similarly be violated when crop yields decline due to climate change, re-
sulting in famine.98 The right to housing, established in the ICESCR,99 is
similarly prone to violation because of climate change. The displacement
of one million people along the Niger River is but one example of a
weather event that deprived individuals of the right to adequate
housing.100
Each of these examples would impose costs upon both individuals and
their governments.101 As such, the burdens associated with anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions are far greater in the developing world, while
the benefits of these emissions have accrued principally on the developed
nations of the North. On its face, then, the disparate impacts on human
rights contravene the principles of distributional justice.
Framing climate change with the language of human rights law is a
departure from the largely technical language of past climate change trea-
ties.102 Using human rights law as a way to look at climate change alters
the discussion from one based purely on science to one based on the ef-
fects of climate change upon specific populations. In short, human rights
law humanizes climate change, something that had been lacking in the cli-
mate justice debate until recent years.103 The approach “puts the focus on
those who will suffer from climate change,”104 and in doing so “provides a
96. DOW & DOWNING, supra note 47, at 76–77 (mapping weather disasters between
2000-2010, specifically noting disasters where more than 1,000 people perished).
97. Id. at 66–67.
98. For a description of expected crop yield changes in the developing world, see id. at
65.
99. ICESCR, supra note 88, art. 11.
100. Ghana: Climate Change Brings Opportunity Alongside Challenges for Africa, supra
note 45.
101. While each of these losses comes at a high cost for the relevant individuals, the
costs that governments must bear to cope with these deprivations are significant for the pur-
poses of this paper. For instance, when populations suffer from climate change events, devel-
oping governments must provide some sort of relief to the affected individuals. Increasing
rates of malaria, diarrhea, and malnutrition, for example, lead to a less productive workforce
for governments already in financial straits; when the government must make additional so-
cial services available to cope with these climate change-related ills, it means that the govern-
ment must necessarily forego other development projects.
102. See, e.g., Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22 art. 3 (1998) (“In the
first quantified emission limitation and reduction commitment period, from 2008 to 2012, the
assigned amount for each Party included in Annex I shall be equal to the percentage in-
scribed for it in Annex B of its aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions
of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A in 1990, or the base year or period determined in
accordance with paragraph 5 above, multiplied by five.”).
103. Limon, supra note 10, at 451.
104. Hunter, supra note 21, at 332.
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clear moral and ethical counterweight to arguments based primarily on
economic efficiency or political expedience.”105
In addition to humanizing the effects of global warming, there are
other benefits to discussing climate change using the language of human
rights law, such as:
drawing attention and giving voice to the concerns and opinions of
vulnerable and marginalized social groups;106 enhancing equity in
international decision-making; encouraging more effective, fairer,
and more sustainable policy outcomes through the promotion of
accountability concepts and of participatory and democratic prin-
ciples in decision-making; emphasizing international cooperation -
even to the extent that cooperation might be deemed a legal obli-
gation; and responding to gaps in the existing climate change pol-
icy architecture.107
In this respect, then, utilizing a human rights approach to climate
change achieves several key goals: it forces individuals to think about the
future human consequences that will result from climate agreements, it
puts the emphasis on the states where the harm is likely to be greatest, and
it shows that those states that are the most vulnerable are also the least
able to help themselves against the threat of climate change. Finally, “a
rights based approach implies that some positions or interests cannot eas-
ily be compromised.”108
Perhaps more importantly, though, the use of human rights law brings
a potential legal solution to a moral imperative. That is, it could lead to a
way to hold large emitters—those most responsible for climate change—
responsible for the harms that they cause. As the Inuit’s petition shows,
the original intent of importing human rights law into the discussion of
climate change was to hold the world’s largest emitters responsible for the
harms they were causing.109 Thus, if a link could be drawn between an
international human rights treaty and a specific harm,110 then it would be
105. Id. at 347.
106. The author of this quote later expands on this particular point, showing the envi-
ronmental justice implications of utilizing a human rights approach.  “[U]sing a human rights
framework helps amplify the voices of those who are disproportionately affected by climate
change – the poor, marginalized, and vulnerable people . . . who might otherwise not be
heard and who, if empowered to do so, could make an important contribution to improving
climate change policy.” Limon, supra note 10, at 451.
107. Id. at 450.
108. Hunter, supra note 21.
109. Inuit Petition, supra note 2 (attempting to hold the United States, the world’s larg-
est GHG emitter, responsible for human rights violations).
110. Most links between human rights violations and climate change would be found in
the ICESCR, because the rights to health, food, and housing are all located within that docu-
ment. ICESCR, supra note 88, arts. 11–12. It is worth noting that the United States of
America is not a party to the ICESCR.
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possible to determine if a human right had been violated and if an emitting
state could be held responsible for this violation.111
B. Applying Human Rights to Climate Change Harms
Following the Inuit Petition and the Male´ Declaration, scholars began
to address the question of how human rights law could be used to redress
harms caused by climate change.112 From an environmental justice stand-
point, it would make sense for the international legal system to find a way
to hold the largest emitters responsible for their past and current emis-
sions, because the inequities caused by the North’s GHG emissions violate
each of the environmental justice movement’s four concepts of justice.
Since the industrial revolution, the nations of the North have been emit-
ting GHGs into the atmosphere—GHGs which are now causing the warm-
ing of the climate. Under any concept of fairness, it would be reasonable
to use international law to make the largest emitters stop further emis-
sions, or at least to make them compensate countries that would be nega-
tively affected by those emissions.113 The way that scholars initially
proposed for doing this was rooted in mitigating future climate change by
reducing present emissions worldwide.114 If the international community
were able to regulate the emitters, the argument goes, then it would force
those most responsible for climate change to either curb their emissions,
compensate the least culpable victims of climate change, or a combination
of both.
Unfortunately, the human rights legal regime is relatively weak.115
The regime is built so that states sign and ratify treaties that enshrine spe-
cific human rights. Signing a treaty signals a state’s promise to implement
111. Each state party to the ICESCR agrees to put its edicts into place within its own
domestic system. Because of this, any human rights violation would also be a violation of the
laws of the country in question. Id. art. 2.
112. See, e.g., Knox, Human Rights, supra note 21, at 200, 212.
113. The concept of making an entity pay for the damages caused by its pollution has
been used, for example, in the domestic law of the United States, and as such, is not a foreign
concept in the legal systems of some industrially developed nations. Cf. Blake A. Watson,
Liberal Construction of CERCLA Under the Remedial Purpose Canon: Have the Lower
Courts Taken a Good Thing Too Far?, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 199, 279 (1996) (describing
how, in the United State’s Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Li-
ability Act (CERCLA), the United States Congress created a system for pollution compensa-
tion and clean-up where the “polluter pays”).
114. Hall & Weiss, supra note 21, at 319 (“[t]o date, legal scholars and practitioners
analyzing climate change have typically discussed mitigation . . .”).
115. Lesley Wexler, The Non-Legal Role of International Human Rights Law in Ad-
dressing Immigration, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F.  359, 375 (2007) (recognizing “the numerous
weaknesses and shortcomings of international law and . . . human rights laws in particular.”);
see generally Jacob David Werksman, Could a Small Island State Successfully Sue a Big Emit-
ter?: Pursuing a Legal Theory and a Venue for Climate Justice, in THREATENED ISLAND NA-
TIONS 409, 428 (Michael B. Gerrard & Gregory E. Wannier, eds., 2013) (describing three
possible cases of suits in international fora between a small developing state and a large
emitter, none of which offer particularly substantial outcomes for the developing state).
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the law of the particular treaty in its domestic legal system. 116 When a
state ratifies one of the human rights treaties, it promises to respect the
human rights of its own citizens by implementing laws congruent with the
treaty. That is, the state pledges to the international community that it will
uphold human rights within its jurisdiction for those subject to its author-
ity. The jurisdiction, then, is vertical; a state is only responsible for those
under its direct control.
The transboundary harms associated with climate change do not map
well onto this regime.117 Industrialized countries emit GHGs, which accu-
mulate in the atmosphere, warm the climate, and cause harms to nations
worldwide. Under a traditional reading of international human rights law,
the emitting states will have no obligation to protect human rights of those
in other countries, because they have no treaty-based extraterritorial
obligations.
Professor Knox has shown that there is a way to read the various
human rights treaties that would oblige states to respect the human rights
of those outside their jurisdiction.118 These rights, then, would be diago-
nal, as compared to the traditional reading of the treaties, in which the
rights are vertical. When a state becomes a party to the ICCPR, for exam-
ple, it pledges to “respect and to ensure to all individuals within its terri-
tory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present
Covenant.”119 This language has been interpreted to mean that a state
party must respect the rights of those under its “effective control.”120 This
is a difficult test, but not an impossible one.121
116. See ICESCR, supra note 88, art. 2 (“Each State Party to the present Covenant
undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation,
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant
by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.”);
ICCPR, supra note 88, art. 2 (“Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other
measures, each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps,
in accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Cove-
nant, to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the
rights recognized in the present Covenant.”); see also Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, art. 2, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1249
U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981) (States parties undertake . . . “(a) To embody
the principle of the equality of men and women in their national constitutions or other appro-
priate legislation if not yet incorporated therein and to ensure, through law and other appro-
priate means, the practical realization of this principle; (b) To adopt appropriate legislative
and other measures, including sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination
against women . . .”).
117. Hall & Weiss, supra note 21, at 348 (“human rights law, at least as it is convention-
ally understood, does not neatly accommodate issues relating to ‘climate change’ . . .”).
118. Knox, Human Rights, supra note 21, at 201.
119. ICCPR, supra note 88, art. 2.
120. Knox, Human Rights, supra note 21, at 202.
121. Id. at 204. Professor Knox says the best chance for a diagonal remedy under the
ICCPR would be in extreme cases, such as the effects of climate change on small island
states. He writes, “[a]s their territory literally disappears, they are arguably at the larger,
more powerful countries that have caused the harm.” Id. If this held true, then the island
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Under the ICESCR, states party to the Convention pledge to “take
steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation,
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available re-
sources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the
rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means.”122
As compared to the equivalent clause in the ICCPR, the clause establish-
ing duty under the ICESCR lacks a jurisdictional component. Because
there is no statement limiting a state’s duties under this treaty to those
within its borders, “[treaty obligations under the ICESCR] may generally
be regarded as extending to all acts of state irrespective of where they may
be taken as having effect.”123 The ICESCR is also significantly different
from the ICCPR in that it specifically denotes a duty of international co-
operation.124
The lack of a jurisdictional component and the inclusion of a duty to
cooperate make it “plausible, at the very least, that the ICESCR imposes
extraterritorial duties.”125 It is possible that the ICESCR could require
states to contribute funds to help developing countries achieve their
human rights obligations. In the context of climate change, this would be
spent to help the receiving country adapt to climate change while mitigat-
ing future harms.126 There is no consensus about the contours of this obli-
gation, however.127 One scholar has suggested that a reasonable
interpretation of the treaty would require a state party to “ensure that it
does not undermine the enjoyment of rights of those in foreign
territory.”128
There are several considerations that make these readings of extrater-
ritorial obligations under international human rights treaties difficult. The
first of these is that the legal bases for extraterritorial duties are con-
tested.129 The more developed states have resisted readings of the
ICESCR, for example, that would require them to aid other states in their
obligations to fulfill human rights.130 Thus, the second obstacle to such
readings is largely political, in that it is difficult for a smaller state to advo-
cate for a particular interpretation of a treaty when the political will of the
state could make a claim that they were under the effective control of the other state, and
thus invoke the ICCPR.
122. ICESCR, supra note 88, art. 2.
123. Knox, Human Rights, supra note 21, quoting Matthew Craven, Human Rights in
the Realm of Order: Sanctions and Extraterritoriality, in EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES, 233, 251 (Fons Coomans & Menno T. Kamminga, eds., 2004).
124. ICESCR, supra note 88, art. 2.
125. Knox, Human Rights, supra note 21, at 207.
126. Id. at 208.
127. Id. at 207.
128. Id. at 209, quoting Matthew Craven, Human Rights in the Realm of Order: Sanc-
tions and Extraterritoriality, in EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREA-
TIES 233, 253 (Fons Coomans & Menno T. Kamminga, eds., 2004).
129. Id. at 210.
130. Id.
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most powerful states is against that interpretation.131 Finally, as Professor
Knox states, the requirement of respecting the rights of those in other
states would only affect each country in its individual capacity, instead of
requiring that each country take worldwide emissions into account when
evaluating its own emissions.132 Under this reading then, each country
could determine that its own emission levels are acceptable, because no
one country alone produces enough GHGs to create global warming
harms that would infringe on human rights.133 Rather, the problem is a
global one with multiple significant actors.
Even without the problems of extraterritorial obligations, however, it
became apparent that the application of human rights law in the context of
climate change would be difficult to apply to large emitting states. The
United States’ submission to the OHCHR regarding climate change and
human rights identified three problems with the application134 and de-
clared that “[t]he basic characteristics of climate change suggest that this
challenge is not especially amenable to human rights-based solutions.”135
The United States first noted that “climate change is a highly complex
environmental issue, characterized by a long chain of steps between the
initial human activities that produce the greenhouse gas emissions and the
eventual physical impacts that may result from those emissions.”136 The
submission goes on to say that it is not possible to tell what increases in
global temperatures are due to natural variability and which are due to
anthropogenic emissions.137 In other words, the United States’ first objec-
tion is that it is nearly impossible to accurately apportion responsibility for
climate change harms, because the causal link is too attenuated and it is
difficult to determine whether an occurrence is naturally occurring or in-
fluenced by GHG emissions.
131. See Marshall Islands Submission, supra note 55.
132. Id. at 211.
133. IPCC, Climate Change 2001: Mitigation, contribution of Working Group III to
IPCC Third Assessment Report 606 (2001), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/
wg3/index.php?idp=383 (“Any individuals’ or nations’ actions to address the climate change
issue, even the largest emitting nation acting alone, can have only a small effect.”).
134. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights made similar findings
about the problems in attributing responsibility to emitting states based on human rights law.
See OHCHR, Report of the Office of the United Nations High Comm’r for Human Rights
on the Relationship Between Climate Change and Human Rights 70, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/
61 (Jan. 15, 2009) [hereinafter OHCHR Report], available at http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/
texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=498811532.
135. Submission of the United States of America to OHCHR Study, Observations by
the United States of America on the Relationship Between Climate Change and Human
Rights 17 (2008) [hereinafter United States Submission], available at http://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Issues/ClimateChange/Submissions/USA.pdf.
136. Id. at 18 (emphasis in original).
137. Id.
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The United States also objected on the grounds that every nation was,
in one way or another, partially responsible for climate change.138 Finally,
the United States objected to the use of human rights law for climate
change harms because of the amount of time that GHGs remain in the
atmosphere.139 The objection is based on a belief that many people who
benefitted from past emissions are no longer living, and that many people
who benefit today are not responsible for the gases that are currently caus-
ing climate change.140 This concern—the “wrongdoer identity problem”—
is a concern with any apportioning of climate change responsibility,
whether in a domestic or international context.141
Each of the United States’ objections is valid when attempting to find
a way to use human rights law as it relates to climate change mitigation.
However, if instead one focuses on climate change adaptation and the po-
tential human rights violations that can happen from failing to adapt to
climate change, the objections are no longer relevant.142 For example, the
wrongdoer identity problem is solved in that a person is able to know that
his or her government did not properly adapt to climate change harms.
While “[d]iscussion of climate change has long focused on ‘mitigation’;
more recently . . . the discussion has shifted to ‘adaptation’. . . “143
Applying human rights law to climate change adaptation, then, may
alleviate the causation problems found when applying human rights law to
climate change mitigation. The next Part lays out the basic arguments for
the application of human rights law to climate change adaptation before
discussing the benefits of such an application.
138. Id. at 20 (“[C]limate change is a global phenomenon. A worldwide and diffuse set
of actors – public and private, wealthy and poor – collectively determine the world’s anthro-
pogenic greenhouse emission levels.”). The United States then quoted an earlier Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) finding that stated, “[n]o single individual or nation
can determine the composition of the world’s atmosphere. Any individuals’ or nations’ ac-
tions to address the climate change issue, even the largest emitting nation acting alone, can
have only a small effect. As a consequence, individuals and nations acting independently will
provide, together, fewer resources than all individuals and nations would if they acted in
concert. This characteristic provides an important motivation for collective, global action.”
IPCC, Climate Change 2001: Mitigation, contribution of Working Group III to IPCC Third
Assessment Report 606 (2001), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/wg3/index.php
?idp=383.
139. United States Submission, supra note 135, at 21.
140. For an interesting discussion of this particular problem, see Eric A. Posner & Cass
R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 GEO. L. J. 1565, 1593 (2008).
141. Id.
142. Hall & Weiss, supra note 21, at 348 (“[H]uman rights law, at least as it is conven-
tionally understood, does not neatly accommodate issues relating to ‘climate change,’ these
deficiencies are at least partly cured when adaptation is separated from a broader discussion
of climate change”).
143. Victor B. Flatt, Adapting Laws for a Changing World: A Systemic Approach to
Climate Change, 64 FLA. L. REV. 269, 270 (2012).
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III. CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION’S HUMAN RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS
A. Adaptation Programs and the Human Rights—
Adaptation Framework
Each year, the parties to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) meet in a “Conference of the Parties”
(COP) in order to monitor the implementation of the UNFCCC, the prin-
ciple UN Convention related to climate change.144 At COP 16, held in
Cancun, Mexico in 2010, the Conference of the Parties affirmed that in the
future, adaptation would need to be addressed with the same priority as
mitigation.145 Adaptation merits more attention because, with the current
state of worldwide GHG emissions, “mitigation efforts alone are unlikely
to solve the problems of climate change.”146
Before discussing the human rights framework as applied to climate
change adaptation, though, it will be useful to get a general idea of what
“adaptation” means in practice. There are, in fact, two separate types of
climate change adaptation practices: proactive and reactive.147 Proactive
practices include those “designed to avoid human suffering and, thus, may
help countries meet their obligations to promote human rights.”148 Exam-
ples of this type of practice include building higher levees,149 preparing
evacuation and disaster relief plans,150 increasing crop and livelihood di-
versification,151 implementing famine early-warning systems,152 and creat-
ing water-storage projects.153 Reactive measures, on the other hand, are
those measures implemented after a harm has already occurred. Measures
in this group include emergency responses,154 post-disaster recovery,155
and relocation efforts for those displaced by natural disasters.156
The UNFCCC proscribed that the least developed countries in the
world (LDCs) prepare reports that show their needs related to adapta-
144. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 7, May 9, 1992,
1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC] (“[K]eep under regular review the implementation
of the Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may
adopt, and shall make, within its mandate, the decisions necessary to promote the effective
implementation of the Convention.”).
145. Cancun Adaptation Framework, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, available at http://unfccc.int/adaptation/cancun_adaptation_framework/
items/5852.php.
146. Daniel H. Cole, Climate Change, Adaptation, and Development, 26 UCLA J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2008).
147. Hall & Weiss, supra note 21, at 326.
148. Hunter, supra note 21, at 359.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Hall & Weiss, supra note 21, at 326.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.; Hunter, supra note 21, at 359.
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tion.157 These “National Adaptation Programmes of Action,” or NAPAs,
have been filed on behalf of 47 nations, and address these nations’ “urgent
and immediate needs to adapt to climate change – those for which further
delay would increase vulnerability and/or costs at a later stage.”158 Each
NAPA lays out the LDC’s adaptation needs, and proposes different
projects that would help the LDC adapt to climate change.159 Using the
NAPAs that each LDC has submitted, the UNFCCC secretariat has devel-
oped a project database that lists each country’s proposed projects, ranked
in order of importance, alongside the proposed cost of each project.160
Each of these NAPAs shows that LDCs are well aware of potential
threats to their populations based on climate change.161 It is the national
government’s awareness that adaptation is necessary that raises the duty
to protect the human rights of those within its territory.162 Otherwise
stated, there are “human rights implications of a failure to adapt suffi-
ciently to a changing environment.”163 Importantly, this view does not ac-
count for where fault lies for climate change. Margaux Hall and David
157. UNFCCC, supra note 144, art 3.
158. National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs), U.N. FRAMEWORK CON-
VENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/national_reports/napa/items/2719.php (last
visited Mar. 1, 2014) (emphasis in original); see also NAPAs Received by the Secretariat, U.N.
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/cooperation_support/
least_developed_countries_portal/submitted_napas/items/4585.php (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
159. The NAPAs themselves are relatively in depth and show a deep recognition of
impending harms from climate change. For examples of specific programs that individual
LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa have identified as necessary to adequately adapt to climate
change, see Djibouti Ministry of Habitat, Urbanization, Env’t, & Reg’l Planning, Programme
d’Action National d’Adaptation aux Changements Climatiques, at 55 (Oct. 2006), available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/dji01f.pdf (describing a proposed project to reduce the
vulnerability of Khor Angar and Atar-Damerjog to climate variability at a cost of $1 million
USD); Government of The Gambia, Gambia National Adaptation Programme of Action
(NAPA) on Climate Change, at 62 (Nov. 2007), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/
napa/gmb01.pdf (detailing a proposed project that would increase fresh water availability in
The Gambia at a cost of $910,000 USD); Ministry of Mines, Natural Res., & Env’t, Envt’l
Affairs Dep’t, Republic of Malawi, National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPA):
Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), at 14
(Mar. 2006) available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/mwi01.pdf (describing a project
to “develop and promote user-friendly sustainable livelihood strategies to target communi-
ties in areas that are vulnerable to climate change, such as the Shire Valley in southern
Malawi” at a total cost of $4,500,000 USD).
160. NAPA Priorities Database, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/cooperation_support/least_developed_countries_portal/napa_prior
ities_database/items/4583.php (last updated Mar. 29, 2012).
161. Awareness of general threats implicitly supports the assertion that different na-
tions are well aware of the human rights implications of climate change. For example, The
Gambia’s proposed plan to increase access to fresh water is related to a recognition of the
human right to potable water. Gambia National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA)
on Climate Change, supra note 159, at 62.
162. See Case of Budayeva and Others v. Russia, HUDOC EUR. CT. H.R. (Mar. 20,
2008), http://echr.ketse.com/doc/15339.02-11673.02-15343.02-20058.02-etc-en-20070405/view/,
discussed infra.
163. Hall & Weiss, supra note 21, at 345.
660 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 35:637
Weiss write, “[t]hat a government did not cause a particular harm is not an
excuse for its failure to act in the face of it.”164 A duty to adapt, then, is
particularly important for developing countries, who had little to no role in
climate change but are nonetheless responsible for protecting the human
rights of their citizens. For this reason, the majority of scholarship regard-
ing this type of application of human rights law has been focused on devel-
oping countries.165
This may at first seem counterintuitive—as one scholar asks, “how can
states have legal duties to address a problem for which they are not legally
responsible?”166 The reasoning here is illustrated in the European Court
of Human Rights Case, Budayeva v. Russia.167 The case involved a mud-
slide in the Russian town of Tyrnauz, in the Central Caucasus. Russian
authorities had received reports of mudslides damaging a dam that pro-
tected the town, and a government administrator had asked for funds to
repair the dam.168 The authorization to repair the dam never came, a mud-
slide destroyed the dam, and subsequently buried portions of the town,
killing between eight and twenty-seven people.169 In the Budayeva case,
the Court held that states were legally required to guard against threats to
the right to life, and that they were required to “take practical measures to
ensure the protection of those whose lives might be endangered.”170
The case is an excellent illustration of the vertical means of enforcing
human rights law. The Russian government knew that a mudslide could
occur within its territory, potentially depriving Russian citizens of their
right to life. While the natural disaster itself does not represent a violation
of the right to life, the failure of the Russian government to act in the
situation was a violation. After Russia failed to act, its citizens were rightly
able to vindicate the loss of the right to life.
164. Id. at 346; Knox, Human Rights, supra note 21, at 197 (“The fact that the state did
not cause the threat does not excuse the state’s failure to try to protect against it.”).
165. Flatt, supra note 143 at 271 n. 8 (discussing how the attention to adaptation “has
primarily focused on adaptation in developing countries”).
166. Knox, United Nations, supra note 21, at 478.
167. Case of Budayeva and Others v. Russia, HUDOC EUR. CT. H.R. (Mar. 20, 2008),
http://echr.ketse.com/doc/15339.02-11673.02-15343.02-20058.02-etc-en-20070405/view/. For an
additional illustration of this principle, see O`neryildiz v. Turkey, 2004-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, a
case involving the failure of the Turkish government to alert a community living in a slum
about the potential of a methane gas explosion near their homes. After the explosion oc-
curred, the European Court of Human Rights found that the Turkish government had failed
to secure the full accountability of state actors to “guarantee respect for the right to life.”
168. Case of Budayeva and Others v. Russia, HUDOC EUR. CT. H.R. (Mar. 20, 2008),
http://echr.ketse.com/doc/15339.02-11673.02-15343.02-20058.02-etc-en-20070405/view/.
169. Id.
170. Knox, United Nations, supra note 21, at 174–75. It is worth noting that the
Budayeva decision was based upon the European Convention on Human Rights, a regional
treaty whose language is functionally similar to that of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. Compare Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4 1950,
art. 2.1 (“Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law.”) with UDHR, supra note 88, art.
3 (“Everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security of person.”). The O`neryildiz case was
also decided under the European Convention on Human Rights.
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The situation would be similar for an application of human rights law
in the context of climate change adaptation. For example, several projects
in LDCs have been funded by the Adaptation Fund, a funding mechanism
created to “finance concrete adaptation projects and programmes in de-
veloping countries that are parties to the Kyoto Protocol and are particu-
larly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.”171 The
Adaptation Fund has granted over $165 million in funding for adaptation-
related projects in twenty-five nations worldwide over the past two
years.172 For example, the Fund granted approximately $9.1 million to
Mauritius to “combat[ ] beach erosion and flood risk in the coastal areas
of Mon Choisy, Riviere des Galets, and Quatre Soeurs.”173 If the govern-
ment of Mauritius were to squander this money, it would then be possible
for “legal advocates [to] wield human rights law to hold the government
accountable for its actions[.]”174 Though this would likely have to occur
after a harm results from the misuse of adaptation funds,175 it would at
least seem possible that an average citizen who was harmed by the effects
of climate change could sue her own government for malfeasance in cer-
tain situations.176
Because of this possibility, challenges based on human rights law in
climate adaptation would stand a greater chance of success than challenges
rooted in mitigation. Hall and Weiss contend that, “claims under human
rights instruments based on a state’s failure to adapt sufficiently to climate
change are less problematic than claims related to a state’s causing and
then failing to mitigate climate change, because adaptation more easily
171. About the Adaptation Fund, ADAPTATION FUND (2011), available at https://www
.adaptation-fund.org/about.
172. Id. The Adaptation Fund is funded by a tax on the Clean Development Mecha-
nism (CDM), which is a mechanism for countries to trade credits to enable different nations
to meet their emissions goals under the Kyoto Protocol. Id. This has led some to question
whether the Adaptation Fund should be viewed as foreign aid, or simply as compensation for
harms caused by emissions. See TOULMIN, supra note 29, at 28. This is discussed further infra,
Part IV B.
173. Climate Change Adaptation Programme in the Coastal Zone of Mauritius, ADAP-
TATION FUND (Nov. 16, 2011 11:34 AM), https://www.adaptation-fund.org/project/climate-
change-adaptation-programme-coastal-zone-mauritius.
174. Hall & Weiss, supra note 21, at 348. Hall and Weiss offer another way to concep-
tualize a potential claim: “complaints relating to allocation process, or any particular action,
inaction, or failed action in these projects, may give rise to human rights claims related to
adaptation practices.” Id. at 326.
175. Id. at 348.
176. It is possible to imagine such a situation in the context of the Mauritius aid men-
tioned above. Part of the funding is to develop an “early warning system, to be staffed all
day, every day, to alert communities to incoming storm surges.” If this funding were used for
a different purpose, particularly one that was not helpful in adapting to climate change, it
may be possible for the family of someone who perishes in a storm surge to hold the govern-
ment liable for a violation of the right to life. The reasoning would be similar to that in
Budayeva—roughly, that someone was deprived of his right to life because of the govern-
ment’s failure to warn of an impending threat to that right. See Climate Change Adaptation
Programme in the Coastal Zone of Mauritius, supra note 173.
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fulfills human rights’ rigid state-actor and causation requirements than
does mitigation.”177
B. Benefits of an Adaptation-Based Approach
Utilizing human rights in a climate change adaptation context offers
several distinct benefits. First, holding nations liable for human rights vio-
lations resulting from a failure to adapt to climate change would give de-
veloping nations a way in which to prioritize adaptation projects. Though
these nations already prioritize such projects,178 prioritizing them based
upon how much each project would affect basic human rights could ensure
that the best protections are given to the greatest numbers of persons.179
The adaptation approach focuses on smaller communities of persons as
well—instead of looking at the emissions of a developed state, the ap-
proach instead looks at adaptation measures used to protect discrete
communities.180
Professor Hunter makes the observation that, in the face of limited
adaptation funding, this approach could set priorities for where limited
funding should be spent during emergencies.181 Imagine a climate change-
related famine occurs in the Horn of Africa. A government in the region
has enough funding to temporarily feed some of the population, but is
unable to provide for each citizen. The government could use the right to
food as a way to determine what segments of the population get supple-
mental food supplies during the famine. For example, the government
could grant food benefits to the poorest segment of the population, while
allowing those who can afford food to continue to purchase for them-
selves. In this way, the government would guarantee that each citizen still
had access to food.
Contrast this with a government that only gave food to a privileged
group, or conversely, opened its granaries for every citizen regardless of
income. If this were the case, those who ended up without the means to
obtain an adequate supply of food could possibly claim that the govern-
ment did not protect their right to food, due to the fact that the govern-
ment could have protected this right had it chosen a different distribution
mechanism.
From the standpoint of environmental justice, the human rights-cli-
mate change adaptation framework would, on first glance, appear to be
177. Hall & Weiss, supra note 21, at 315.
178. See NAPA Priorities Database, supra note 160.
179. See Hall & Weiss, supra note 21, at 356.
180. Id.
181. Hunter, supra note 21, at 360–61. Hunter uses the example of the right to housing
and compares the relative necessity of providing housing to different victims of Hurricane
Katrina. While illustrative of the point, I use a separate example because the United States is
not a party to the ICESCR, in which the right to housing is enshrined. There was a case in the
aftermath of Katrina that attempted to hold various parties liable for contributing to climate
change, thereby adding to the Hurricane’s ferocity. This case was dismissed by the 5th Cir-
cuit. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F. 3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010).
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highly desirable, at least as it relates to power structures within individual
nations.182 For example, holding an LDC’s government accountable for
adaptation failures would seem fair in the case of a government that had
policies protecting rights for one group while ignoring rights violations re-
lated to a separate group. From the standpoint of distributional justice, it
would seem appropriate to give the second group a means to vindicate
their lost rights in some way, whether in a domestic or international forum.
Similarly, the notion of corrective justice would dictate that those who
have been injured in some way by a government’s failure to properly
adapt should be compensated for that loss. The desire to compensate
someone who loses a home, or goes hungry, or loses a loved one due to a
climate-change related event is perfectly reasonable, and touches upon our
basic conceptualization of fairness. It is the sad truth that, ultimately, peo-
ple worldwide will suffer due to climate change; this suffering will largely
be the result of the actions of other people, separated by decades of time
and thousands of miles. A basic concept of justice, then, would say that
any compensation for someone whose basic human rights are violated by
climate change would be instinctually desirable.
There are obvious benefits to utilizing the human rights legal regime
in the context of climate change adaptation. This use of the regime seems
possible given the vertical nature of human rights and also seems to be a
means by which to get compensation to those whose rights have been in-
fringed upon. While these benefits are undeniable, there are also certain
aspects of the proposal which merit pause. In the next Part, I discuss dif-
ferent reasons to use restraint in exercising this approach, with particular
attention to how an environmental justice perspective may caution against
the use of human rights as the law would apply to direct lawsuits in inter-
national or national fora against developing states.
IV. CAUTIONING AGAINST AN ADAPTATION APPROACH TO UTILIZING
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CLIMATE CHANGE
Despite the benefits of applying human rights law in this way, the de-
veloped nations of the world have largely rejected applying human rights
law as it applies to climate change. The United States has been the most
vocal, and has flatly stated that “a complex global environmental problem
[climate change] with these characteristics does not lend itself to human
rights-based solutions.”183 The American submission to the OHCHR con-
tinues by saying that “the United States takes the view that a ‘human
rights approach’ to addressing climate change is unlikely to be effective,
and that climate change can be more appropriately addressed through
traditional systems of international cooperation and international mecha-
182. While this type of challenge may appear desirable in a limited hypothetical such as
this, there are other considerations that make an actual suit such as this one a questionable
goal. See infra Part IV.
183. United States Submission, supra note 135, ¶ 6.
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nisms for addressing this problem, including through the political
process.”184
There is a distinct lack of enthusiasm in the submissions from other
developed nations as well. Canada “believes the UNFCCC is the most ap-
propriate forum in which to address issues related to climate change,”185
necessarily implying that the human rights framework is a less appropriate
means of addressing the problem. France’s submission only notes briefly
that a study could be useful to identify possible gaps between the human
rights treaties and climate change, but makes no comment on the applica-
tion of human rights law in any context.186 The United Kingdom states
that “climate change in itself is not a human rights violation” and instead
advocates for international cooperation in addressing the threat that cli-
mate change poses.187
There are thus two main concerns with litigating human rights law in
the adaptation context. The first of these, as indicated by the reluctance of
developed countries to implement human rights law related to climate
change, is largely based on political and economic concerns, while the sec-
ond rests in the different concepts of environmental justice.188
A. Political and Economic Constraints
The political problem begins in that it is likely that LDCs would be the
primary targets for adaptation-related litigation based on human rights
law. As a practical consideration, the world’s largest historical emitter—
and thus, the first likely target for such a challenge—is exempt from these
types of suits in many cases, because the United States is not a party to the
ICESCR.189 The countries of the European Union, while signatories, are
also not necessarily friendly to the idea of using human rights law in this
context. Second, the states that are going to suffer the worst effects of
climate change are those that are the least able to adapt adequately to
184. Id. ¶ 4.
185. Submission of Canada to OHCHR Study, Government of Canada Response to
Request for Information by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Con-
cerning a Request in the Human Rights Council Resolution 7/23 for a Detailed Analytical
Study of the Relationship Between Climate Change and Human Rights 1 (Nov. 2008), availa-
ble at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/ClimateChange/Submissions/Canada.pdf.
186. Submission of France to OHCHR Study, Reponse au Questionnaire du Haut Com-
missariat aux Droits de l’Homme Suite a la Resolution 7/23 du Conseil des Droits de l’Homme
3 (Aug. 21, 2008), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/ClimateChange/Sub-
missions/France.pdf.
187. Submission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to
OHCHR Study, Human Rights Council Resolution 7/23: “Human Rights and Climate
Change” 3, available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/ClimateChange/Submissions/
UK.pdf.
188. See supra Part II.
189. This would exempt the United States from liability based on claims of violations to
the right to food, the right to water, the right to health, and the right to housing. See
ICESCR, supra note 88.
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protect all human rights.190 Thus, the more developed, wealthier nations
of the North have more funding to spend on fewer climate change
problems while those of the South have significantly less money to spend
on substantially more severe problems stemming from climate change.191
Another hurdle is that the protection of human rights represents a
positive obligation for states. That is, states must utilize their power in
order to safeguard certain rights in some cases and in others must protect
against the intrusion against these rights by climate change events. The
protection of these rights for LDCs is also positive in that private actors
and other nations have typically caused the harms; the government of an
LDC must take affirmative action to guard against the results of the
harms.192
However, such positive obligations are the hardest type of obligations
for a government to uphold. Beth Simmons has said that “[t]here is little
doubt that most governments do not have the capacity to implement every
aspect of their international legal obligations. Most operate under admin-
istrative and resource constraints; these are severe in the poorest coun-
tries. In no area is this truer than in the provision of positive rights . . .”193
The poorest countries she speaks of are, of course, those most likely to
suffer harms related to climate change. The positive obligation to protect
from the adverse effects climate change, while congruent with the reading
of the Budayeva decision, represents a substantial departure from the fac-
tual situation that led to Budayeva, where no actor, save nature itself, was
in any way responsible for the mudslide that caused such massive damage.
Contrast this with global climate change, where scientists can identify
which nations are primarily responsible for causing particular harms. In
the case of climate change-related harms, then, it is not that the interna-
tional community cannot identify who is responsible; it is that interna-
tional law itself is inadequate for making the culpable parties take
responsibility for their actions.
Acting affirmatively to guard against human rights violations is even
more difficult for LDCs considering the costs of adaptation against availa-
190. See supra, Part II.
191. J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of Envi-
ronmental Law, 40 ENVT’L L. 363, 403 (“[I]t is the least developed countries that drew the
short straw – they will feel climate change more severely and have the least capacity to re-
duce vulnerability and boost resilience.”); see also, Int’l Council on Human Rights, Climate
Change and Human Rights: A Rough Guide 1 (2008), available at http://www.ichrp.org/files/
reports/45/136_report.pdf (“[R]esource shortages also limit the capacity (of governments as
well as individuals) to respond and adapt to climate change.”).
192. McInerney-Lankford, supra note 78, at 218 (“In the context of climate change, the
obligation to protect is more positive, because it requires States to take steps to protect per-
sons within its jurisdiction or to exercise effective control against the negative impacts of
climate change. It may also require that States take action to protect persons against the
harmful acts of private parties and non-State actors that cause or accelerate climate change.”)
(emphasis in original).
193. BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
DOMESTIC POLITICS 359 (2009).
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ble funding.194 Some estimates show that, in the developing world, adapt-
ing to climate change will cost between $50-80 billion on a yearly basis.195
Other estimates are higher—one source says that by 2015, developing
countries will need $86 billion annually to properly adapt.196 The World
Bank has estimated the yearly cost at $70-100 billion annually between
2010 and 2050.197 The funding available to developing nations earmarked
for adaptation is significantly less.198 While the developed countries of the
world have pledged to make $100 billion a year available to the developing
world for climate change mitigation and adaptation by 2020,199 key details
of this plan have still not been decided.200
Given that developed countries are against the use of human rights (at
least as it applies to them) in the context of climate change, the difficulties
poor governments face in implementing positive rights, and the limited
funding that developing nations have to address climate change, using
human rights as a means of holding developing nations liable for violations
may not be conducive to fostering political consensus in future climate
change negotiations. According to Marc Limon, a large reason for the ini-
tial argument for importation of human rights law in the context of climate
change was that the nations most likely to suffer from climate change be-
came frustrated that there was no way to hold large emitters accountable
for the “devastating human consequences” that resulted from their emis-
sions.201 Using human rights law seemed a logical way to look at the prob-
lem, with the hopes that large emitters would be forced to take account for
the human rights violations in other nations. Developing countries were
especially frustrated, though, because of their “knowledge of unequal
194. This is a particularly important point, since the means of using human rights in
climate change adaptation relates to a government misuse of funding.
195. TOULMIN, supra note 29, at 27 (“Building on estimates from the World Bank, Stern
and the IPCC, Oxfam estimates that adaptation in developing countries will cost at least
US$50-80 billion each year.”).
196. See Hunter, supra note 21, at 359.
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power relationships underlying the problem, as illustrated by the ‘inverse
relationship between responsibility for climate change and vulnerability to
its impacts.’”202
There is already a considerable amount of distrust between developed
and developing countries in climate change negotiations.203 Developing
countries distrust the North in that they believe the developed countries
may try to prevent their future development, or try to make adaptation
funds conditional based on human rights factors.204 Enforcing human
rights law against developing countries in the context of adaptation real-
izes both of these fears. If international law were to dictate that a develop-
ing country’s government must compensate those whose rights have been
violated by a failure to properly adapt, it would necessarily mean that
some of that government’s money would be unable to go to other develop-
ment projects. By establishing liability for countries that fail to use adapta-
tion funding to protect human rights, the legal scheme would imply
that any adaptation funding is somewhat conditional. That is, a
country would be required to use its funds to protect human rights
in a given situation, as opposed to what that country’s government
believed to be the best use of a given amount of money, lest it
potentially be held liable for failure to properly adapt to climate
change.205
A final political consideration is that, during any climate-change re-
lated event, a nation would simply be able to declare a “state of emer-
gency,” and suspend its human rights obligations immediately.206 Some
202. Id.
203. Developed countries are skeptical about the use of human rights because they feel
that developing countries may try to use climate change as a way to advocate for the recogni-
tion of a human right to a ‘safe and secure environment.’ Developing countries are concerned
that the West could use human rights to prevent their development, or to make the grants of
adaptation funds conditional upon other criteria. Id. at 460-61.
204. Id.
205. As an illustration, imagine that a developing nation has $100 million to spend on
adapting to climate change.  It could spend the money to protect the coastal homes of a fifty-
person village, or could spend the money to improve the infrastructure in its capital city, with
money to spare for relocating the village. The first project protects the right to housing for
those in the village, and the second project protects no human rights. The second project,
though, would be of much greater value to a greater number of people. The country’s govern-
ment would like to improve its infrastructure and provide for the relocation of the threatened
village, but if human rights law were to govern adaptation, it may require that the govern-
ment undertake the first option instead, lest it be held liable for a rights violation.
206. See McInerney-Lankford, supra note 78 at 233. She goes on to state that “the so-
bering conclusion is, therefor, that human rights law does not display any special capacity to
tackle the social and human impacts of climate change and that the existing weaknesses of
the human rights regime appear exacerbated in conditions of climate change, with little obvi-
ous sign of renewal or reinforcement in the future.” Id.; see also, Scott P. Sheeran, Reconcep-
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Doctrine, and Politics, 34 MICH. J. INT’L L. 491, 492 (“The central international human rights
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authors have argued that this could make the argument of adaptation lia-
bility nearly toothless.207
Developing countries were the ones to first say that human rights
should be used in the context of climate change. They said this in order to
get the world’s largest emitters to bear some responsibility for the harms
that they caused in the developing world. These countries have a much
more difficult time adapting to climate change, and have a much smaller
budget with which to do so. Based on this history, utilizing human rights
law to hold developing countries liable for inadequate adaption to climate
change runs the risk of increasing the distrust apparent during climate
change negotiations. If this distrust were to somehow impede future nego-
tiations, then the benefit to those who were compensated by offending
states may be less than the ultimate value of having a greater amount of
international cooperation.
B. Environmental Justice Concerns
Environmental justice’s broader conceptualizations of “justice” may
similarly caution against using human rights law as a sword against devel-
oping nations in the adaptation context. The use of human rights law in
this way could have implications rooted in concerns of distributional jus-
tice, procedural justice, corrective justice, and social justice. Can we in
good conscience tell developing countries that their governments are the
only ones liable for climate-change related harms, because the only way
that international law will function is against governments who do not
properly adapt? Can we in good conscience tell developing countries this,
considering that the largest emitters in the world are functionally immune
from such a challenge, despite being responsible for the vast majority of
anthropogenic GHGs?208 “Perhaps we must, but that is surely because the
law is wrong, rather than because our instincts of fairness, equity, and jus-
tice are wrong.”209
Distributional justice requires that everyone is given the right to equal
treatment, and that benefits and costs are evenly distributed amongst
populations.210 In the context of global climate change, this means that
each nation should be equally benefited and burdened by anthropogenic
GHG emissions. While the current state of the world is nowhere near a
level of parity that would satisfy the dictates of distributional justice, the
proposal to hold developing nations’ governments responsible for adapta-
tion failures would only serve to exacerbate the distributional disparity
already apparent in adverse climate change events. The benefits of GHG
emissions are highly concentrated in the North, the countries who also
treaties envisage a regime of derogation allowing states parties to temporarily adjust their
obligations under the treaties in exceptional circumstances.”).
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control the funding for individual adaptation projects. The costs of GHG
emissions are largely experienced in the developing South, whose govern-
ments in many circumstances must ask for funding from the North to im-
plement protections for their populations. At best, holding developing
states’ governments liable for human rights violations related to climate
change events does nothing to ameliorate the distribution of costs and
benefits associated with GHG emissions. Indeed, it may even discourage
development in developing countries. If a specific nation were forced to
spend large amount of money in compensating those harmed by climate
change because it could not adapt properly, it would be foregoing money
that could otherwise be used to help the country become more developed.
Procedural justice requires that each party be treated as an equal—
taken on the international stage, it requires that each state have a voice in
climate change negotiations.211 There are already large disparities in bar-
gaining power in international climate change negotiations.212 Small, de-
veloping states are less politically powerful than developed, economically
powerful emitters.213 The ultimate effect of the human rights–adaptation
framework is that the most powerful states, the world’s largest emitters,
are functionally immune from human rights challenges based on climate
change. Instead, under an adaptation framework, those very governments
who used their marginal political clout to advocate for a human rights ap-
proach to climate change are the same governments who would be liable
for human rights violations following a climate change-related event. The
original intent of importing human rights law into the climate change dis-
cussion was to find a way to hold the world’s largest emitters liable for
their actions. Developing states, sitting at the negotiating table, used their
limited political weight to advocate for the use of human rights law; when
this law is then used against them instead of against those who are truly
responsible for climate change, it appears as though their initial desires
went unnoticed. If the world’s developing nations could, for example, have
a voice on the best way to meld international human rights law to the new
realities of climate change, it is certain that the result would be different—
that those nations emitting GHGs would be held responsible for their
harms. The fact that developing nations’ desires cannot be realized in this
manner—and indeed, could be turned against them—would seem to vio-
late the ideal of procedural justice.
Corrective justice is, of the four broader conceptions of justice encap-
sulated in the term “environmental justice,” the concept that will be most
offended by the human rights-climate change adaptation framework. Cor-
rective justice, in the context of climate change, requires that the nations
of the world that are most responsible for the harms arising from climate
change help those nations who will suffer damages due to climate change.
The idea of corrective justice in this context should require that the
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212. See Marshall Islands Submission, supra note 55.
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world’s developed nations help each developing nation that is harmed by
climate change to the extent that there is no net detriment to them as a
result of GHG emissions. In other words, this ideal should be viewed as
akin to a common law tort remedy: those responsible for the harm should
have the duty to make the victims of the harm whole again. However, on
the international plane, the human rights in climate change adaptation
scheme does nothing to help compensate nations who have to spend
money to protect themselves from the results of someone else’s actions.214
There is no justice in forcing a poor nation to spend the contents of its
limited coffers on internal claims of climate change harms, while those
who are at fault for climate change in the first place continue to enrich
themselves while emitting more GHGs.
Finally, the ideal of social justice remains unsatisfied by a climate
change adaptation-human rights framework. In the domestic context, so-
cial justice dictates that each individual should be able to live “as befits a
human being.” Extrapolated to the international plane, with states as the
relevant actors, an equivalent ideal is that each nation should be able to
function unhindered by the actions of other states. In this respect, a re-
quirement that developing states spend funds for harms caused by other
states seems, at its core, unfair—particularly when these states are already
limited in their overarching capacity for rights protections.
Ultimately, it would seem that implementing human rights law to pun-
ish the poorest nations of the world would be manifestly unjust. The final
result of using human rights in the context of climate change adaptation is
that those who are most to blame for climate change are able to continue
emitting to the detriment of the developing world, while the world’s least
wealthy governments could see their funding further limited and con-
strained in considering options for climate change adaptation.
CONCLUSION
All of this is not to say that the argument for using adaptation in the
context of climate change lacks merit; on the contrary, it seems the best
and most practical way to implement human rights law in the context of
climate change. Just because it may be possible to allow developing na-
tions to be held accountable for failures to properly adapt, however, does
not mean that it should be the preferred method of introducing human
rights law to climate change.
Instead, the human rights implications of climate change adaptation
should be used to further inform negotiators at climate change confer-
ences, and to humanize the climate change debate writ large. Using human
rights as a way to frame the issue of climate change is expressively desira-
214. The only “compensation” that these nations received is through the Adaptation
Fund. The Adaptation Fund, as a tax on the CDM, is viewed in the developing world as a
compensatory fund for harms that they will endure as a result of the CDM. However, even
this fund isn’t truly “compensatory,” in that its funding is given to projects that a committee
best determines fit the plans for “adaptation,” making the fund more like aid than compensa-
tion. See TOULMIN, supra note 29.
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ble, in that it can contribute a way to conceptualize the real dangers to real
people arising from climate change.215 It is possible, too, that an increased
focus on human rights during climate change negotiations will be able to
better build a political will to take action,216 whether it is increasing the
amount of money that the developed world gives the developing world for
adaptation purposes217 or simply to call attention to the moral imperative
of helping developing nations.218
Mali, in its submission to the OHCHR, stated that, “[w]hen vulnerable
communities have tried to use human rights law to defend their rights and
seek climate justice, important weaknesses [in human rights law] were re-
vealed.”219 It seems unjust for the international community to tell nations,
such as Mali, that the best way for them to achieve climate justice is to
adapt properly under human rights law, lest they be held accountable for
the harms their people suffer due to climate change. Rather, the interna-
tional community should take note of Mali’s submission, and find a way to
make “laws and institutions for the defense of human rights . . . evolve to
the new reality of climate change.”220
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